Taiwan, a second Ukraine?

27 september 2024 | Thierry Baudet

On 24 September, the Dutch Prime Minister, Dick Schoof, left the Netherlands for the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Thanks to a remarkable motion by Jan Paternotte (D66), he will have to promote an extremely risky Taiwan policy there on behalf of the Netherlands. Forum for Democracy was the only party in the entire House of Representatives to oppose this policy because, like Ukraine earlier, it makes Taiwan the plaything of US warmongering.

On Thursday 12 September, the Lower House voted on the positions to be taken by the Dutch government at the UN General Assembly (24-30 September). One of the motions before it related to Taiwan. Submitted by Jan Paternotte (D66), the motion was an almost verbatim reproduction of earlier statements by US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken. The gist: Taiwan should be allowed to become a member of the United Nations and its affiliated organisations. This implies sovereignty. In doing so, the motion stated that:

(1) the currently valid UN resolution on Taiwan's status does not preclude this;

and that:

(2) such Taiwanese membership of UN organisations would not undermine the ‘one-China policy’ which the Netherlands has long pursued.

Both assertions are factually incorrect. Recognising Taiwanese sovereignty is reckless, unwise, misguided and moreover bad for both the Netherlands and Taiwan itself. To explain this, however, some context is important.

The tug-of-war surrounding Taiwan dates back to the mid-20th century when the communists led by Mao Zedong seized power and the deposed Chinese government, led by Chiang Kai-shek, took refuge on the island of Taiwan.

It was 1949, the time of the Cold War, and the West naturally viewed Mao Zedong's victory with suspicion. The island of Taiwan offered a solution: it had been conquered by Japan during World War II and was in a temporary transition phase, in which authority had not yet been returned to China. As such, the island was effectively under US military rule.

Chiang Kai-shek and his followers were to find safe haven here until Japan abandoned its imperial claims in 1952 and Taiwan fell back to China. By then, however, a new status quo appeared to have emerged.

Chiang Kai-Shek had rearmed and more importantly, the Korean War (1950-1953) ushered in a complex international equilibrium in which neither East nor West seemed willing to risk another major war. Although Mao was firmly in control of mainland China, Chiang Kai-shek continued to claim from Taiwan to be the true government of China.  Because of the full support of the United States, the latter was also allowed to continue to sit on the United Nations Security Council on China's behalf.

It was a particularly curious situation: a government-in-exile pretending for years from a relatively small island to represent one of the largest and most populous countries on earth.  Decisions in the United Nations that had no effect whatsoever because Mao Zedong's real government did not go along with them. Only when Richard Nixon saw a reason to improve diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China in 1971 did this change. The United States recognised Mao Zedong's government as legitimate. Its representatives were integrated into the UN and the Taiwanese delegation, which until then had occupied China's seat, was told to return home.

UN General Assembly resolution 2758, adopted on 25 October 1971, confirmed the new situation. Contrary to what is apparently thought, namely that this resolution ‘does not judge that the People's Republic of China enjoys sovereignty over Taiwan, nor does it judge Taiwan's future participation in the United Nations or other international organisations’, the resolution states that

‘the representatives of the People's Republic of China are the only legitimate representatives of China at the United Nations’

and that

‘the representatives of Chiang Kai-Shek be immediately removed from the seats they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all its affiliated organisations.’

Both the text of this resolution, and the context in which it arose, leave nothing unclear: a dispute over legitimate representation needed to be resolved, agreements needed to be reached with the actual China, not with a government deposed more than 20 years earlier which by then had no more say there.

By no means, however, does the resolution seek to split China, or to give Taiwan independence. So where Paternotte's motion concludes that recognition of Taiwanese sovereignty by the Netherlands ‘need not be an obstacle to the Netherlands’ one-China policy’ he is mistaken: it would represent a radical break with that policy. It would hugely worsen the Dutch relationship with China, while doing nothing to improve the situation for Taiwan: on the contrary, it would push diplomatic solutions to the situation even further out of sight, while increasing the likelihood of armed conflict.

We recently saw this happen in a similar situation: when NATO announced Ukraine's imminent membership in 2008 and then incited Maidan protesters to stage a coup in 2014. The result was that by 2022, Putin saw no option but to respond militarily.

The Americans are using the same playbook in the Far East. Their escalation policy was not in Ukraine's interest and is it in Taiwan's interest now. Nor is it in Europe's interest, and it is even unclear how America actually benefits except inasumuch as it benefits the military-industrial complex. Ambitious politicians can pretend to be important. But it is extremely disappointing that virtually the entire Lower House of the Dutch parliament has gone along with this.

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